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NOTES AND COMMENT
the value of property of a plaintiff, who has come into equity seeking
a mandatory injunction against the defendant, where such defendant
has the right to condemn such property.
The decision in the present case is a valid exercise of the powers
of equity, and the plaintiff's constitutional rights have not been
infringed upon.
J. CYRIL O'CONNOR.
SECURITY DEPOSITS UNDER LEASEs.
In the case of Senz, Inc. v. Hammer I the tenant sought to
recover a deposit under a lease, afer having removed from the prem-
ises pursuant to a ten-day notice, served upon him by the landlord, to
pay or move. The lease contained a provision that a continued
default in the payment of rent, for ten days after said notice was
served, shall terminate the lease without any entry or further act on
the part of the landlord. It was also provided that the foregoing
provision is intended as a conditional limitation. The court held
that where from the provisions of a lease, though obscure, an infer-
ence must be drawn that the parties contemplated a deposit as security
for the performance of all the covenants, and that the landlord's
agreement to repay it after the expiration of the lease was conditioned
on the tenant's full performance, a removal of the tenant from the
premises, and acceptance by the landlord of possession after a default
by the tenant, does not warrant the recovery of the deposit by the
tenant. Following the rulings of International Publications v.
Matchabelli,2 and Hand v. Rifkin,3 the court held that, under such
circumstances, the liability of the tenant survives the severance of
the relationship of landlord and tenant.
The general question underlying these cases is, whether the
termination of the lease destroys all obligations thereunder, or whether
a proper covenant concerning the continued liability of the tenant
survives the termination so as to allow the landlord to hold the deposit
until such time when all the damages are ascertainable and to apply
same in satisfaction of such damages.
The cases of International Publications v. Matchabelli and Hand
v. Rifkin hold that the parties may contract for a continuing liability
on the part of the tenant, beyond the termination of the lease. While
these two cases refer to termination because of summary proceed-
ings,4 the principle is the same whether the termination occurs by
1265 N. Y. 344, 193 N. E. 168 (1934).
1260 N. Y. 451, 184 N. E. 51 (1933).
'263 N. Y. 416, 189 N. E. 476 (1934).
'Section 1434 of the New York Civil Practice Act expressly provides
that the issuance of a warrant for the removal of a tenant cancels the lease
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operation of law or by contract of the parties, provided, of course,
that the tenant has properly covenanted in substance for full per-
formance of all the terms, covenants and conditions of the lease or
that he will be liable in damages for deficiency covering such con-
tingency.
These covenants of continued liability are legal under the com-
mon law, and they are not prohibited by statute; nor are they against
public policy.5 As was said in Michaels v. Fishel "The right to
enter into engagements of this character exists at common law, and,
since there is no statute to prevent, as was said in an early case, such
a contract 'certainly is not an illegal agreement, nor is there anything
unreasonable in the lessee agreeing to completely indemnify his lessor
for any injury which may arise to him by the lessee's breach of his
own agreement.'"
Although the relationship of landlord and tenant has ceased and
the lease itself is annulled, the tenant's liability survives since the
contractual relationship between the parties is not terminated.7 The
covenant is deemed a separate and distinct agreement despite the
fact that it is part of the lease which itself is destroyed. What sur-
vives, however, is a liability, not for rent, but for damages,8 because
a lease is an instrument of dual legal effect; it is both a contract and
a conveyance.
That such a covenant should survive the termination of the
lease seems reasonable, otherwise the very purpose for which it was
inserted becomes futile. Concerning this we find the following in
Baylies v. Ingram: 9 "It is evident that the covenant itself could not
come into operation until there was a breach of its conditions. Its
purpose was to provide a remedy in favor of the landlord, should the
defendants be guilty of a: breach of the terms and conditions of the
lease. Manifestly, a provision which gave a remedy for the tenant's
default ought not to be held to fail the moment the relation of land-
lord and tenant ceased in consequence of a breach by the tenant.
The covenant was aimed at just such a contingency, and was utterly
valueless unless it can be made to serve the purpose of its creation,
and annuls accordingly the relation of landlord and tenant, except that rent
payable or a claim for use and occupation is -not thereby discharged. This
was the old Section 2253 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A similar statute
was in effect since 1820, when the first law for the recovery of demised premises
by summary proceedings was enacted in New York, although an English statute
on the subject was in force while we were a colony of Great Britain. (Laws
of 1820, c. 194, §3, amending Laws of 1813, c. 202; 2 R. S. 515, §43; 11 Geo.
II, §19.)
See Slater v. Von Chorus, 120 App. Div. 16, 17, 104 N. Y. Supp. 996,
997 (lst Dept. 1907).
0 169 N. Y. 381, 387, 62 N. E. 425, 426 (1902).
'Halpern v. Manhattan, 173 App. Div. 610, 160 N. Y. Supp. 616 (1st
Dept. 1916), aff'd, 220 N. Y. 655, 115 N. E. 718 (1917).
'Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N. Y. 333, 337, 162 N. E. 97, 97 (1928);
see Kottler v. N. Y. Bargain House, 242 N. Y. 28, 150 N. E. 591 (1926).
'84 App. Div. 360, 363, 364, 82 N. Y. Supp. 891, 894 (1st Dept. 1903).
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otherwise it would be a mere dead letter without any vitality what-
ever."
Under such circumstances, then, where a tenant defaults in the
payment of rent, with the resultant cancellation or termination of the
lease, and, relying on such termination, he sues the landlord to
recover the deposit, the courts hold that the tenant must abide the
liquidation of the loss. In other words, where a tenant is obligated
for damages under such a covenant he will not be allowed to recover
his deposit, despite the termination of the lease, until such time when
the damages are ascertainable. And until such time, such actions
will be dismissed for being premature.10 So, tin Hand v. Rifkin, it is
said: "We think that under these covenants the tenant's liability
survives the severance of the conventional relationship created by the
lease, but that the loss, if any, which the landlord may suffer through
the tenant's default has not been, and cannot be, ascertained until the
end of the term denominated in the lease." 11
Thus it is that, despite an old writer who said,1 2 "a tenant can
make no return for a thing he has not," a tenant can, although out of
possession, be held liable for the premises he does not occupy, and,
in effect, be compelled to make a return for the very thing he has not.
The security deposit is very commonly used in New York for it
is only by this contractual method that the landlord has some security
out of which to satisfy the damages or deficiencies in such cases.
Many states allow to the landlord a security right, without such pro-
visions in a lease, as, for example, the right of distraint or a statutory
landlord's lien on goods or property of his tenant. Formerly New
York also had a distress for rent but in 1846 this was abolished.
And for this reason the security deposit is so widely used here,
although in those states which allow the statutory security, the security
deposit provisions are also included in leases, since this is a simpler
method of obtaining the security than the enforcing of the statutory
security right.13
In regards to security deposits, however, it should be noted that
the non-performance by the depositor does not vest title to the deposit
in the secured party. It merely allows him to resort to the deposit
only in the event that there are damages sustained by the secured
party and then, only to the extent of actual indemnification for his
loss or damage.14 And it is in this respect that deposits on leases
differ with moneys paid on a contract of purchase. In such a case
the vendee paying the deposit cannot recover it back.15 For, as said
"Lenco v. Hirshfield, 247 N. Y. 488, 159 N. E. 718 (1928).
"263 N. Y. 416, 420, 421, 189 N. E. 476, 477 (1934).
7 BAcoN's AmR. (7th ed.) 57.
"Wilson, Lease Security Deposits (1934) 34 COL. L. RaV. 426.
14 Peirson v. Lloyds, 260 N. Y. 214, 183 N. E. 368 (1932).
'Haynes v. Hart, 42 Barb. 58 (N. Y. 1864); see Page v. McDonell, 55
N. Y. 299, 303, 304 (1873); Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 131, 139 (1881);
Saperstein v. Mechanics, 228 N. Y. 257, 126 N. E. 708 (1920); Friedland v.
Argentor, 214 App. Div. 242, 211 N. Y. Supp. 896 (1st Dept. 1925).
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in Chaude v. Shepard,16 "In such a case the party so paying, who
afterwards by reason of his default is deprived of or denied the
benefits of his contract, cannot recover back the money so paid by
him upon it." But where a tenant deposits money, he may recover the
deposit back; even though he be in default, if the damages which the
landlord sustained are satisfied therefrom. "This may seem anoma-
lous," says McAdam," "but it is because the equitable principle of
avoiding forfeitures has been applied to the one case, but not to the
other." So, where there was money deposited under a lease (which
lease did not contain a covenant of continuing liability) and the
tenant is dispossessed in summary proceedings for non-payment of,
rent, the courts will make the landlord return the deposit for security,
after deducting therefrom the amount apportioned for rent due
prior to the removal.' 8 "For there can be no recovery for damages
accruing after the termination of the lease by summary proceedings
in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary." 19
There are, however, some cases in which a landlord may retain
the amount of deposit on the default of the tenant as outright dam-
ages and not as a security. These are the "liquidated damage" cases.
20
Here a provision is inserted in the lease to the effect that since the
damages are not ascertainable the landlord may retain the amount
on deposit as liquidated damages. But the general tendency of the
courts is to treat such deposits as penalties and to allow the landlord
to keep only so much as would indemnify him for his actual loss or
damage.21 Concerning this is the following quotation from Seidlitz
v. Auerbach: 22 "The great weight of authority is to the effect that
where a contract contains a number of covenants of different degree
of importance and the loss resulting from the breach of some of
" 122 N. Y. 397, 402, 25 N. E. 358, 360 (1890).
' 2 McADAM, LANDLORD AND TENANT (5th ed. 1934) 1123.
"Kelly v. Miles, 48 Hun 6 (N. Y. 1888), aff'd, 122 N. Y. 645, 25 N. E.
957 (1890).
" 8 CARMODY'S N. Y. PRACTICE (2d ed. 1933) pt. 1, 317; see Crausmann v.
Graham, 95 Misc. 608, 159 N. Y. Supp. 709 (1916).
'J. & H. Garage v. Flow, 225 App. Div. 65, 232 N. Y. Supp. 242 (1st
Dept. 1928), aff'd, 251 N. Y. 553, 168 N. E. 424 (1929). (In the Appellate
Division, Finch, J., said: "The general principles of law governing the con-
struction of a lease providing for liquidated damages are as follows: Equity, in
order to do justice at a time when justice has become over-ridden by legal
formalism and love of logic, established the principle of granting relief from
penalties and forfeitures. This principle, as applied to an agreement in a lease
for a sum certain to become liquidated damages, does not raise a presumption
that such a sum is a penalty. On the contrary, when the parties to such a
lease are competent to contract, their intention will be carried out unless the
Court can see that the liquidated sum, although denominated 'liquidated dam-
ages,' is but a cloak of language to attempt to hide a sum which is out of
proportion to, and differs greatly from, the actual damages which would in the
course be suffered," at pp. 66, 67.)
" Chaude v. Shepard, 122 N. Y. 397, 25 N. E. 358 (1890) ; see Seidlitz v.
Auerbach, 230 N. Y. 167, 129 N. E. 461 (1920).
230 N. Y. 167, 173, 129 N. E. 461, 463 (1920).
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them will be clearly disproportionate to the sum sought to be fixed as
liquidated damages, especially where the loss in some cases is readily
ascertainable, the sum so fixed will be treated as a penalty. The
strength of a chain is that of its weakest link." So too, in City of
New York v. Brooklyn & Manhattan Ferry Co.: 23 "The tendency
of the courts in doubtful cases is to favor the construction which
makes the sum payable for breach of contract a penalty rather than
liquidated damages, even where the parties have styled it liquidated
damages rather than a penalty."
WALTER W. PADWE.
-238 N. Y. 52, 56, 143 N. E. 788, 790 (1924).
